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Forward Guidance Cold Turkey Comes With Withdrawal Symptoms - But The Patient (Investor) Always Recovers

Written by James Aitken

Posted on August 07, 2026

I’ve never posted my investment research in the public domain, but such is the interest in the Fed & Warsh I thought it might be useful to do so. Here is a lightly edited version of what I sent to my clients last week. Do let me know what you think.
  1. On Wednesday last week, Bloom (BE US Equity) reported $0.78 in single quarter EPS. That was better than expected, and they raised revenue guidance for 2026. Nearly every one of Bloom’s operating metrics is growing at 3-4x year on year. If you think as I continue to do that the AI capex juggernaut rolls on, & that Bloom could earn as much as $10 per share in 2027 then at around $160-$162 Bloom was available at approximately 16x estimated 2027 earnings. So, I bought more. My thesis on Bloom is simple, hopefully not too simple: the stuff works; demand is off the charts; and neither the United States nor any other (c.f. South Korea) major AI country is likely to meet its objectives without Bloom’s support. What could yet go right?

  2. Whether it be the Hunts in silver, Hamanaka in copper, Alan Bond, LTCM, John Rusnak (2002), the NAB FX options idiots (2004), Amaranth (2006) or any number of fools during 2007-2008 markets eventually sniff out the weakest link: then clean them out at the absolute bottom or top, depending which way the weak link is positioned. We can now add Aschenbrenner to the list. His fund’s name, Situational Awareness, could be a title of Nassim Taleb’s or someone’s next behavioural finance book. As hard as it is to do, please try to distinguish between Aschenbrenner’s AI thesis (still solid), and his risk management (channelling Sam Bankman-Fried). Whomever took down Aschenbrenner’s public equities book just made a small fortune - and I suspect you’re reading this. Well played.

  3. When investment is in progress it constitutes actual aggregate demand in the economy; when it has been completed, it constitutes potential aggregate supply in the economy. What should happen in monetary policy if apparently attractive investment opportunities present themselves, and, then, what happens if the appropriate monetary policy is not in fact pursued?
    Appropriate monetary policy’ means ensuring that the real interest rate is at its natural level. Not neutral, R-star or other such confections: the natural level.
    As David Laidler wrote in 2003: ‘A voluntary decision to save by households is simultaneously a decision to consume at some time in the future, while a decision to invest by firms is simultaneously a decision to supply consumption goods in the future, and the rate of interest is the crucial relative price that coordinates these choices. Only so long as the market rate of interest is equal to the natural rate of interest does it accomplish this and create a state of what is usually called monetary neutrality’. So what? Well, as Laidler continued: ‘A coordination failure with respect to the intertemporal allocation of resources occurs because a relative price, the interest rate, is set as a disequilibrium value by the [central] banking system. The longer it continues, the greater is the imbalance between firms’ capacity to provide consumer goods in the future and households’ desire to purchase them, an imbalance that is matched by a shortfall in firms’ current demand for consumer goods [e.g. the price of GPUs]. But continue it will, so long as the crucial intertemporal relative price [the rate of interest] remains at the wrong level.’

  4. We have over three decades deviated so, so far from any concept of a natural interest rate. The repeated, preferred central bank usage of ‘neutral’ is an implicit admission of that. Amidst this colossal AI and national resilience investment boom, any attempt to rediscover that natural rate (e.g. very substantially higher long-term nominal and real yields) must be extremely painful for markets by extension, painful for consumption. Other than Warsh’s courageous, nascent, and possibly stillborn communications experiment I see zero political will in any major economy to rediscover the natural rate of interest. Quite the opposite: given what the rediscovery of the right balancing, natural rate of interest implies for asset prices (a lower clearing price), no policy maker wants to attempt it. They are too scared.

    For all my macroeconomist readers and clients, this will sound harsh but it seems to me modern macroeconomics is essentially useless for providing guidance on either what should happen next or what will happen next to get us out of this mess. I applaud the macroeconomist community for continuing to try, but it reminds me of a fly inside Wittgenstein’s fly-bottle, buzzing frantically from one wall of the bottle to another in a futile attempt to escape.

  5. One of the truly wonderful policy makers (he was always much more than just a central banker) I have interacted with over the decades is the now retired Peter Praet. We bonded during 2007, over both a shared birthday and his incredible, almost unique understanding (amongst his peers) of the plumbing, policy, and politics. A great man.

    Back in 2013, Peter wrote something on forward guidance: the Odyssean element had to do with the central bank’s disclosure or clarification of its monetary policy strategy. Through its Delphic element, forward guidance gave information about the central bank’s perceptions of macroeconomic fundamentals. There is nothing wrong with moving away from forward guidance. Nothing.

    It is about time we stopped being spoon (F)ed. However, to go from Odyssean or Delphic forward guidance to – literally – 'a blank piece of paper’ within a month or two probably requires better communication than we have seen thus far.

  6. It is clear Warsh would like a mulligan on his terrible press conference, as he and his fellow members offer nervous guests on the first tee at The National (Augusta): rather than slicing it towards the pro shop, or duck hooking it towards the ninth fairway he might hit a controlled fade down the lefthand side.

    Cue outrage from the commentariat and cue a regrettably smarmy Twitter post from me.

    I really regret this post, but I won’t remove it. I want it to serve as a permanent, public reminder to myself of the expensive bid-offer between thinking fast and thinking slow.

    As the late, great Kahneman would remind us we should aim for less of the former, more of the latter. Nevertheless I typed: ‘After today’s performance, we’re probably another point away on the long bond from “no guidance” pivoting to “intra-meeting panic leaks”. Standby. Capitalism is a bully. The chief bully’s - Mr Market’s - innate nature is to create fear in those that don’t show enough fear. Hazing the new kid is tried and tested: delivering a word salad gains no respect’.

  7. Thinking fast: ‘Warsh has no idea what he is doing, what a fiasco. Total clown’. No, no, no. Feels great to say or think that, even if only venting, but do not fall into that ‘thinking fast’ trap.

    Thinking slow (these words may sound familiar to clients): ‘Central banks have gone from price makers in a low inflation world, to price takers in a world driven by the AI and national resilience investment boom. Policy rates should be a bit higher. How much higher, we do not yet know but the Fed should at least remove 2025’s insurance cuts. Why are we having a hissy fit over necessarily higher long-term nominal and real yields? We should continue to focus on the fundamental, which isn’t whether Warsh guides us, or not: it is whether this AI Capex boom continues’.

    And the numbers suggest it will.

  8. What can Warsh now do? He knows he made a mistake. There is no problem forgoing forward guidance on expected moves in interest rates—it is not necessary when policy is above the zero lower bound and it can be too constraining on markets and the Fed (see 2021, for example.). But Warsh needs to articulate how he’s seeing the economy, including why the nine members thought keeping rates unchanged was consistent with getting back to their 2% target. His refusal to take on that question despite being asked several times, to acknowledge that the rise in rates he touted embodied expected tightening, and his hints that the inflation goal post might be moved, all raised questions about his understanding of what might need to be done to restore price stability and/or his determination to take the hard steps.

  9. Nevertheless, the situation is recoverable at the upcoming Jackson Hole gathering. Warsh is a very smart guy – ask him. Sure, he can talk about his beloved task forces, but somehow, he also must convince markets that he’s willing to adjust policy to achieve stability and what he and the FOMC are looking at to make that judgment. Some softer U.S. economic data in the near term may also give him some breathing space.
So what?
Despite a dreadful opening effort, I am keeping an open mind about Warsh: are you?

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Global

When will the AI Bubble Burst?

There is no shortage of people willing to tell you that artificial intelligence has become a bubble

that will, at some point, inevitably burst. Share prices have risen steeply, the capital expenditures are enormous and every company with a plausible AI story has come up with a new way to present itself. Yet markets are rarely that straightforward and just because investors are noisily worrying about a bubble does not, by itself, mean that it is about to burst.

How large is the AI bubble today?

It depends on what you mean by “AI bubble.” If the question is whether artificial intelligence itself is a passing fad, the answer is certainly no. Adoption is accelerating, investment is accelerating and the demand for the infrastructure behind it is real. 77% of companies use, or are exploring the use of AI in business. The bottlenecks, however, are real too.

If the question is whether all of the listed companies associated with AI deserve their current valuations, that is a different matter. Markets have a habit of taking a genuine long-term trend and pushing certain parts of it too far, too quickly.

The current boom is already substantial because it is capital-intensive. The hyperscalers are not simply spending on software licences, they are committing enormous sums to data centres, chips, power supply and physical infrastructure. Analysts expect that spending to increase further. J.P. Morgan Asset Management predicts the five major US hyperscalers will spend about US$700 billion on AI-related capital expenditure in 2026, with spending forecast to rise to around US$800 billion in 2027.

Global annual investment in data centers

IEA have tracked the rapid increase in worldwide datacentre growth, predicting this will reach US$900 billion by 2029.

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IEA (2025), Global annual investment in data centres, Base Case, 2015-2030, IEA, Paris, Licence: CC BY 4.0

The better way to frame it is not that the market has reached a single, measurable bubble size. It is that expectations are becoming increasingly uneven. Some parts of the AI ecosystem may still be under-owned, particularly the less glamorous businesses helping to power and connect the build-out. Other parts are clearly being asked to deliver a great deal. That is where the real share valuation risk sits.

Do share bubbles always pop?

Not necessarily. Investors tend to imagine bubbles ending with one dramatic event: a violent sell-off, a recession, or a financial crisis that makes the excess obvious in retrospect. Sometimes that happens. But markets can also work off excess in less blatant ways.

A share price can go nowhere for years while earnings slowly catch up. Valuations can compress without a crash. Capital can move from the obvious winners into less visible parts of the market. None of that makes for a particularly satisfying headline, but it is often how markets adjust.

That’s important when talking about AI. The technology does not need to fail for some AI-related shares to disappoint. Equally, an expensive area of the market does not need to collapse for valuations to become more reasonable.

What history can teach us about stock-market bubbles

There is a tendency to look back at previous bubbles as though everyone should have seen the ending coming. Of course, once the share prices have collapsed and the failed companies have been identified, it all looks obvious.

In real time, it is more complicated. Railways were world-changing, even though railway speculation produced booms and busts. Computers were era-defining, although many early technology businesses failed. And the internet was transformative, despite the fact that the dot-com bubble created valuations that could not survive contact with reality.

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The point is not that markets always get it right. They clearly don’t. The point is that markets can be wrong about the timing, the winners and the price, while still being broadly right about the direction of travel. That’s a useful way to think about AI.

Why the AI boom is different

The obvious comparison is with the dot-com era, when a genuinely transformative technology attracted vast amounts of capital and investors asked a great deal of some very highly rated businesses.

There are similarities, of course. But there is also an important difference. In the late 1990s, a great deal of the investment case rested on what the internet might one day become. It’s still achieving that potential decades later. With AI, adoption is already visible. Companies are using the tools, demand for computing capacity is rising and the people building the infrastructure are dealing with increasingly obvious constraints.

The bottlenecks are everywhere. Power is scarce in the right locations. Data-centre capacity takes time to build. Grid connections and digital infrastructure can take years. Environmental challenges must be solved. The supply of the most advanced chips remains tightly controlled. That does not remove valuation risk, but it does tell us that this is not simply a narrative being projected onto a few headline shares.

Watch earnings growth, not the calendar

Markets do not normally fall apart because investors decide that a chart has gone up for too long. They fall apart when the earnings that were meant to justify the price fail to arrive.

That is particularly important in an AI-driven market. Capital expenditures are rising sharply, and the return on that spending will eventually have to show up somewhere: in revenues, productivity gains, margins or some combination of the three. If earnings grow, the bubble needn’t burst.

Investors should therefore be wary of turning a valuation debate into a calendar forecast. Saying that a company trades at a high multiple of forward earnings is not the same as saying its share price must collapse next quarter. It may fall. It may also trade sideways while profits catch up.

The more important task is to watch the evidence. Are earnings estimates rising or falling? Are customers still spending? Are order books holding up? Those questions will tell us far more about the durability of the AI boom than any confident prediction about the date of a bubble burst.

Where the real risks lie

The most obvious danger is not the technology itself. It is the price investors are prepared to pay for exposure to it.

Markets are very good at taking a real theme and pushing the most obvious beneficiaries further than the fundamentals can comfortably support. That does not mean the theme is wrong. It means the margin for error becomes very small. A company can be doing everything broadly right and still fall sharply if the market had already assumed perfection.

There are other issues too; AI spending is placing heavy demands on corporate balance sheets, particularly where the investment is moving beyond internally funded capital expenditures and towards borrowing. At the same time, the equity market may have to digest more supply: fewer buybacks, more stock-based compensation and eventually some very large IPOs.

That matters because markets can become surprisingly fragile when liquidity is thin. The risk isn’t that AI will disappear. It’s that the market may become less tolerant of disappointment precisely when the capital needs of the boom are becoming more visible.


The future of AI: not a burst, but a recalibration

It’s tempting to try and predict the date when the AI boom will be confirmed or disproven. The problem is, it's rare for markets to provide that kind of clarity. Instead, the next phase is likely to be messier. Investors will become more selective about which companies can convert AI spending into revenue, profits and returns on capital. They will become less willing to reward vague promises. They may also begin to pay more attention to the less exciting businesses whose products are essential to the build-out.

That could mean difficult periods for some of the biggest names, greater dispersion within the S&P 500, or that the companies which performed best in the first phase of the boom are not necessarily the ones that perform best in the next.

But none of that requires artificial intelligence to be a bubble in the old-fashioned sense. Just as the technology is already reshaping business, it is also reshaping investment decisions across the economy. What changes from here is not the direction of travel, but the value of individual AI-related assets.

The boom is unlikely to burst. It is much more likely to become harder work.


Written by James Aitken

July 27, 2026